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PERCEIVING SUBTLE SEXISM: MAPPING THE
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES AND
LEGAL NARRATIVES THAT OBSCURE
GENDER BIAS
DEBORAH L. BRAKE*
In early January of 2007, the AALS Section on Women in Legal
Education held a panel discussion on "Subtle Sexism in Our Everyday
Lives" at the AALS Annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Such discussions
about the barriers facing women in the legal profession often trigger a
fatigue with talking about gender and a denial by some that gender remains
worthy of attention.1 The denial of gender bias can occur at a collective
level, in which detractors urge "getting past" gender in setting an agenda,
and at an individual level, in which individuals deny the role of gender bias
(or gender privilege) in their own lives.2 The denial of gender bias at the

* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A version of this
paper was first presented at the AALS Annual Meeting at a panel on "Subtle Sexism in Our
Everyday Lives," sponsored by the Section on Women in Legal Education. Many thanks to
the participants at that program, and especially to my colleague Pat Chew for organizing the
program and for reading and commenting on a draft of this Article. I benefited from the
research assistance of Christopher Helms on this and related projects.
1 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Midcourse Corrections: Women in Legal
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 475, 476 (2003) (discussing the conventional view of legal
education that "'the woman problem' has been solved and equal opportunity is an
accomplished fact," and the reality that "our partial progress has itself become an obstacle to
further change"); Judith Reskin, A Continuous Body: Ongoing ConversationsAbout Women
and Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 564, 568 (2003) (discussing skeptical and less
friendly reactions to ongoing conversations about gender in the legal academy, in which
skeptics urge participants to "move on" to other topics and critics even "argu[e] that, by
calling attention to problems of inequality and by acting affirmatively to remedy them, we
create inequality"). Participants in such conversations often feel compelled to justify the
ongoing significance of gender, acknowledging progress but pointing to the half-empty
glass. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, New Directionsfor Women in
the Legal Academy, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489 (2003) (discussing the progress women have
made in the legal academy since 1970, but also the persistence of disadvantages that block
the path to equality for women in the legal academy, and women of color in particular).
2 See Sylvia A. Law, Good Intentions Are Not Enough: An Agenda on Genderfor
Law School Deans, 77 IowA L. REv. 79, 81 (1991) ("[I]t is still quite common in American
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individual level can fuel a collective denial of the importance of gender
issues. This Article explores the complexity of perceiving gender bias at the
individual level, which in turn affects understandings of the role of gender
in society more broadly, and surveys some of the psychological processes
that contribute to the denial of gender bias in everyday life. In this Article, I
am concerned both with how women law faculty and women lawyers-the
immediate subjects of the panel discussion-perceive gender bias, and with
the more general forces that complicate perceptions of gender bias across
professional lines.
Sorting out the influence of gender on an individual's professional
life is no easy task. For women law faculty, contemplating the role of subtle
sexism might raise a nagging set of questions. How does my gender affect3
my professional life? Do students react differently to me because of it?
What explains that small but disturbing set of hostile course evaluations in
my large required classes, and do my male colleagues get them

too? 4

Is it

my imagination, or are those guys in the back row challenging my
authority? 5 Is the tenure process gendered or just crazy? 6 How does gender
legal education to hear comments that seem to deny gender discrimination is deeply

entrenched and takes other than intentional forms.").
3 See Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal

Academy, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 333, 336 (1996) (citing results of a study showing that
"forty-eight percent of all women students and seventy-three percent of minority women

students believe that female professors, more than male professors, must prove their
competence to their students").
4 See infra note 172 for sources suggesting that gender and race bias influence
student evaluations. See also Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptions of
Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 315 (1994) (discussing the
"hostility or a presumption of incompetence from students, especially male students" toward
women law teachers).
5 See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 1, at 486 ("Women faculty, particularly women of
color, often experience classroom challenges to their competence and authority."); Farley,
supra note 3, at 334, 342 (stating that "[b]ecause women lack the presumption of
competence, they are continuously being challenged, resulting in a hostile 'prove it'
atmosphere," and noting that "often women will spend much more time on class preparation
in order to anticipate every possible line of attack they may face in class").
6 As

Tina Grillo has remarked:

[T]he system of getting tenure is crazy for everybody ....The problem
that faces minority women is this: we cannot tell how much of the
craziness has to do with sexism and racism-alone or in combination,
expressed overtly or expressed covertly through institutional politicsand how much has to do with a fundamentally crazy system.
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shape my professional obligations and institutional commitments? 7 Why are
silent during faculty meetings, while almost
so many women on the faculty
8
all of the big talkers are men?
These questions defy easy and absolute answers, and in this respect,
are no different than similar questions that might interrogate the role of
gender in other professional settings. We live in a world where gender, race,
and sexuality form a complex web of identity that subtly affects, in myriad
ways, how people respond to us. As we know from life experience and the
study of law, facts are messy and causation is tricky to pin down. How do
we make sense of the uncertainty? Social psychologists use the term
"attributional ambiguity" to refer to the "uncertainty about whether the
outcomes you receive are indicators of something about you as an
individual, or indicators of social prejudices that other people have against
you because of your stigma." 9 Short of written policies that openly
discriminate or overt expressions of prejudice, discerning the presence of
gender bias necessarily involves attributional ambiguity.
The messy reality of perceiving gender bias contrasts sharply with
the common assumption, reflected in discrimination law, that a person's
belief that she has experienced discrimination is fixed and immediate. My
interest in exploring the process by which people come to believe they have
experienced gender bias grew out of my work on an amicus curiae brief
Tina Grillo, Tenure and Minority Women Law Professors: Separatingthe Strands, 31 U.S.F.
L. REV. 747, 747-48 (1997).
7 See Susan B. Apel, Gender and Invisible Work: Musings of a Woman Law
Professor, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 993 (1997) (discussing the "invisible work" disproportionately
done by women law professors, including "community building," student counseling, and
providing support and service to colleagues and the institution).
8 See Martha Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield." Contemporary
Dilemmas Facing Women Law Professors, 11 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195, 204-06
(2005) [hereinafter Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield] (discussing the subtle

loss of status that occurs when women's expressed ideas are not valued, and explaining how
this process causes even senior and accomplished women faculty to be less outspoken at
their home institutions); Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1, at 493 (discussing the institutional
messages that leave "women less sure of their voices" and "less likely to speak in the faculty
lounge and slower to commit their ideas to paper"). See also Martha Albertson Fineman, The
New "Tokenism," 23 VT. L. REV. 289 (1998) (explaining why the increasing numbers of
women in the legal academy have not significantly challenged the norms and culture of the
legal academy).

9Brenda Major et al., Attributions to Discriminationand Self-Esteem: Impact of
Group Identification and Situational Ambiguity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 220,
220 (2002) [hereinafter Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination].
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filed in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.' 0 In Ledbetter, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that an employee must bring a Title VII pay
discrimination claim within 180 days of the time the intentionally
discriminatory decision was first made or else be time-barred from ever
bringing the claim, even if the employee continues to receive less pay
because of sex." The lower court's decision treats pay discrimination as
analogous to other "discrete" discriminatory acts governed by the rule the
Supreme Court adopted in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v.
Morgan.l2
In Morgan, the Court held that each discriminatory act, such as a
hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, or transfer decision, triggers Title VII's
statute of limitations period, even if it is part of a related pattern of
discrimination that extends beyond that "discrete" act.' 3 In so holding, the
Court rejected the more lenient continuing violation theory, which lower
courts had applied to allow plaintiffs to toll the limitations period for
discriminatory acts that are part of a larger pattern of related
discrimination. 14 Without directly stating where pay discrimination claims
fall on this continuum, the Court in Morgan distinguished discrete
discriminatory acts from hostile environment harassment. 5 The Court
crafted a different and more lenient rule for hostile environment
harassment, treating each harassing act as part and parcel of the larger
pattern of harassment, and tolling the running of the limitations period until
the last act of harassment occurs.16 The Court justified the special rule for
harassment because it typically requires a number of harassing acts in order
10See Brief for National Partnership for Women & Families et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162
(2007) (No. 05-1074). As this issue was going to press, on May 29, 2007, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162
(2007). A 5-4 majority ruled that a Title VII pay discrimination claim's filing period begins
running at the time the intentionally discriminatory pay decision was made, and any ongoing
pay disparities resulting from that decision are time-barred once the 180-day filing period
expires.
" 412 F.3d 1169 (11 th Cir. 2005).
12 536

U.S. 101 (2002).

13 1d. at 110-11.
14

Id. at 108, 113-14.

" Id. at 115.
16Id. at 117.
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to have an actionable claim. 17 At no point did the Court consider how long
people take to realize they have experienced discrimination, nor did it
acknowledge the difficulty of discerning discrimination.
This body of precedent assumes that employees possess immediate
and certain knowledge of the moment in time at which discrimination
occurs. Perceiving discrimination is assumed to be uncomplicated, such that
plaintiffs who do not complain shortly after discrimination occurs are
vulnerable to criticism for "sitting on their rights."' 18
One modest exception in the doctrine moderates this assumption,
but it nevertheless stops short of acknowledging the complexity involved in
perceiving discrimination. Existing Title VII law leaves open the possibility
that a discovery rule might delay the running of the limitations period until
the plaintiff knew or should have known that she experienced
discrimination. This concession, however, has not seriously disrupted the
law's assumption that knowledge of discrimination is unproblematic. For
one thing, the Supreme Court has been content to leave the existence of a
discovery rule in Title VII cases an open question, an indication that it
views justifiable delays in perceiving discrimination to be the exception,
rather than the norm. 19 In like fashion, the Eleventh Circuit in Ledbetter
simply observed that the question of whether equitable considerations
justified a tolling of the limitations period in that particular case had not
been litigated. z More importantly, perhaps, even those lower courts that
have adopted a discovery rule in Title VII cases have failed to grapple with
the complexity of perceiving discrimination. These courts have applied the
"7Id. at 117-18.
18For example, in a case where an employer counted time off for pregnancy
against employees in calculating their service credit (and thus seniority and eligibility for
early retirement), the employer argued that Title VII discrimination charges filed many years
after the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's passage were untimely, and that a district court's
decision to that effect should be upheld. See Final Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 7, EEOC
v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 129 F. App'x 953 (6th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-3496) ("The court relied
on [the Sixth Circuit's] precedents, which preclude employees from sitting on their rights
and imposing 'an open-ended period of liability for the employer."').

19National RR Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 114 n.7 (2002)
(stating that equitable tolling principles apply under Title VII, but not discussing the
applicability of a discovery rule); id.
at 124 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing her belief
that "some version of the discovery rule applies to discrete-act claims"). See also id at 113
(cautioning that equitable doctrines such as tolling and estoppel "are to be applied
sparingly").
2

412 F.3d 1169, 1180 n.16 (1lth Cir. 2005).
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discovery rule to set the moment in time when the plaintiff should have
known of the alleged discrimination at the point when the plaintiff first
learned of the adverse job decision (or in the case of pay, that a male
comparator earns more), rather than the moment when the plaintiff actually
perceived the discrimination. 2 1 Thus, even the law's allowance for a
discovery rule does not seriously disrupt the assumption that knowledge of
bias is uncomplicated and readily inferable from the existence of an injury.
In addition to the assumptions reflected in law, the assumptions
embedded in popular culture also conflict with the realities of how people
perceive discrimination. The dominant story in mainstream culture is that
women and minorities are hyper-vigilant in perceiving bias, to the point of
mistakenly perceiving sexism and racism when it does not really exist.
Mainstream culture is replete with derogatory references to "feminazi"
women who blame everything on gender, and with depictions of strident
women who are too quick to blame sexism for their troubles. 22 Likewise,
people of color are derided for "playing the race card," as if an attribution to
race is always an artifice and never an insight.2 3 This cultural narrative
21 See, e.g., Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025 (N.D. Iowa
2002); Oshiver v. Levin, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386-87 (3d Cir. 1994). But see Hamilton v. First

Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (rejecting a discovery rule for pay
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and holding that the "last possible
time that pay discrimination could have occurred was the date when [the plaintiff] received
his final paycheck").
22

See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, "Women

's

Rights" Getting Left Out, SEATrLE TIMES,

May 13, 2006, at A6 (discussing the reluctance of nationally prominent women politicians to
publicly discuss "women's rights," lest they be labeled "feminazis" by talk radio hosts);
Michelle Garcia, New York Women in Line to Get Restroom Relief, WASH. POST, May 27,
2005, at A3 (reporting that a proponent of city legislation to increase restroom facilities for
women was labeled a "feminazi"); Stephen Kiehl, Eatery Draws Firefor "Sexy Nurses":
Arizona's Heart Attack Grill Asked to Stop Using Servers' Costume, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24,

2006, at A31 (describing the hostile reaction to complaints about sexually objectifying
uniforms for servers at one restaurant, including labeling the complainant a "feminazi");
Mike Rosen, Editorial, AAUW's Sexual Fantasies, ROCKY MTN. NEwS, Feb. 10, 2006, at
43A (criticizing an American Association of University Women study finding high rates of
sexual harassment on college campuses and stating that "hypersensitive women or outright
man-haters have been led to believe they have some right to be insulated from anything, real
or imagined, to which they might conceivably take offense").
23 A LexisNexis search for the term "playing the race card" in the most recent two
years of news (search date, Mar. 6, 2007) turned up 1151 stories including that term.
Typically, the term is used to criticize persons for cynically and strategically inserting race
into an area of public discourse where it does not belong. See, e.g., Harold Johnson &
Timothy Sandefur, Editorial, Judge Doesn't Deserve the Dixiecrat Treatment, S.F.

CHRON.,

May 2, 2005, at B5 ("To be sure, many of [Judge Janice Rogers] Brown's conservative
supporters can be accused of playing the race card."); Willis Shalita, Editorial, Black
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encourages suspicious treatment of those who would attribute adverse
outcomes to gender or race bias.24
Research in the field of social psychology suggests that the realities
of perceiving bias are much more complex than either legal doctrine or
dominant cultural understandings acknowledge. First, the widespread
cultural assumption of hyper-vigilance is largely a myth. Although there is
modest evidence that some persons who belong to stigmatized social groups
are highly sensitive to prejudice cues, 5 the weight of evidence suggests that
under-perception of gender bias is closer to the norm than hyper-vigilance. 26
Studies consistently show, for example, that the vast majority of women
who experience behavior that objectively qualifies as sexual harassment do
not perceive that they have been sexually harassed.27 More generally, social
American From Africa Offers His View on Obama's "Blackness," S.F. CHRON., Mar. 1,

2007, at B7 ("Black America better wake up and smell the coffee. Time for playing the race
card in national politics is over, but much more than that, it is a disgrace, especially coming
from victims of racism.").
24

Cf Rhode, supra note 1, at 487 ("Women students who express strong feminist

views have been stigmatized for 'overreaction'
'manhaters."').
25

or for behaving like 'feminazis'

or

See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social PsychologicalPerspective

on Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 803-04 (2006)
(summarizing and describing as "sparse" the "empirical evidence that members of
historically disadvantaged groups claim discrimination when none exists, or even that they
are especially sensitive to and vigilant for discrimination").
26

See id. at 804-06 (summarizing studies supporting the view that people err on

the side of denying or minimizing discrimination targeting them); Brenda Major & Cheryl R.
Kaiser, Perceiving and Claiming Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 285, 286-87 (Laura Beth Nielsen &
Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (citing sources supporting the view that "members of
disadvantaged groups typically miss, underestimate, or deny the extent to which they are
personally targets of prejudice"); Elizabeth H. Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected:
Perceptions of Women Who Confront Sexist Remarks, 45 SEx ROLES 567, 568-69 (2001)
[hereinafter Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected] (summarizing research showing that women
tend to explain away sexism, despite evidence that it has occurred); Charles Stangor et al.,
Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 69, 69 (2002) ("[P]rior research has shown that members of stigmatized groups are
in many cases unlikely to report that negative events that occur to them are due to
discrimination, even when this is a valid attribution for the event.").
27

Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment, 84 J.

390 (1999) [hereinafter Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling] (citing
and discussing research documenting a wide disparity between the numbers of women who
experience unwelcome, offensive sexual misconduct and those who identify their
experiences as sexual harassment). See also Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining:
APPLIED PSYCHOL.
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psychologists have long observed a disconnect between women's
recognition that women as a group experience discrimination and individual
women's widespread denial that they have personally experienced it. 28 This
finding was first noted in a 1978 study in which 400 male and female
workers rated their personal job satisfaction and grievances no differently,
despite objective evidence that the women in the study were subjected to
and added to the
sex discrimination.2 9 Subsequent research has 3updated
0
evidence supporting the under-perception thesis.
Second, social psychology research refutes the assumption that
knowledge of discrimination is uncomplicated and immediate. In reality,

Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday Work World, 25 L. & SoC. INQUIRY 1151,
1156 (2000) [hereinafter Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining] (rejecting a lack of legal
understanding as a sufficient explanation for women's resistance to labeling their
experiences as sexual harassment).
See Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination,27 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
371 (1984) [hereinafter Crosby, The Denialof PersonalDiscrimination].As James M. Olson
and Carolyn L. Hafer observe: "Of course, it is a statistical impossibility for all members of a
group to experience less discrimination than other members." James M. Olson & Carolyn L.
28

Hafer, Tolerance of PersonalDeprivation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 157, 163 (John T. Jost &

Brenda Major eds., 2001) [hereinafter Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation].
These authors also note that the discrepancy between perceptions of discrimination against
one's social group and perceptions of discrimination against oneself hold true for a wide
variety of disadvantaged groups and "crosses racial, gender, and economic boundaries." Id.
at 164; see also John T. Jost, Negative Illusions: Conceptual Clarificationand Psychological
Evidence Concerning False Consciousness, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 397, 404-05 (1995)
[hereinafter Jost, Negative Illusions]. These findings are consistent with the tendency of
minority group members to accommodate and internalize the perspective of the majority.
29 Crosby, The Denial of PersonalDiscrimination,supra note 28, at 372-73. See
also Donald M. Taylor et al., The Personal/GroupDiscrimination Discrepancy: Perceiving
My Group, But Not Myself To Be a Target for Discrimination, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 254 (1990).
30 See, e.g., Jacquie D. Vorauer & Sandra M. Kumhyr, Is this About You or Me?

Self-Versus Other-DirectedJudgments and Feelings in Response to Intergroup Interaction,
27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 706 (2001) (reporting results of a study in which
members of a racially stigmatized group who interacted with a prejudiced peer felt badly
after the interaction, but interpreted the negative feelings provoked by the interaction as
having to do with themselves rather than the other person's prejudice); see also Olson &
Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation,supra note 28, at 163 (citing research finding that
"individuals who might be expected to report a lot of discrimination often report very little").
For findings on the denial of personal disadvantage by women in the legal profession, see
Faye Crosby et al., Discontent Among Male Lawyers, Female Lawyers, and Female Legal
Secretaries, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 183 (1983).
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there are a number of obstacles to perceiving oneself as a victim of
discrimination. These obstacles function as a form of "static" or
"interference" that clouds the picture and distorts the process of perception.
Such "interference" is especially likely when gender bias takes a subtle
form, without obvious markers. Not surprisingly, people are much better at
detecting prejudice when the intensity of prejudice cues increases,
and are
3
'
ambiguous.
more
or
subtle
is
bias
the
when
so
do
to
less able
In a world characterized by attributional uncertainty, a number of
psychological and social processes converge to create a good deal of
interference with perceptions of gender bias. These processes make
"seeing" how sexism affects daily life a complicated endeavor. Rather than
clear the fog to get a better picture of how gender influences life experience,
the dominant narratives of discrimination law tend to reinforce the
perceptual static. This is perhaps especially true for those of us in the legal
academy who are more likely to have our understandings and perceptions
shaped by the discourses and narratives of law.
This Article surveys the social psychology literature on the
processes that complicate perceptions of gender bias and explores how
these processes are reinforced by the narratives of discrimination law. Part I
draws on social psychology research to chart the obstacles that interfere
with perceiving subtle sexism. Part II considers how the narratives of
discrimination law further suppress perceptions of bias. The point is not that
law leaves behind subtle gender bias in the discarded category of "not
actionable"-an argument well made by other legal scholars. 32 Rather, it is
that law's knowledge-producing function obscures subtle gender bias from
view, reinforcing the ideology that merit, and not gender, explains women's
situations in the workplace. As explained below, law performs this function
by setting up narratives that constrain the likelihood of perceiving and
challenging gender bias. Finally, Part III briefly considers the example of
student evaluations as an illustration of how these processes can converge
to muddy insights into how and whether gender bias shapes our
professional lives.

3 Brenda Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem: A TransactionalModel, 14 EUR.
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 77, 81 (2003) [hereinafter Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem].
32 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 747-53 (2001) [hereinafter
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding] (discussing the limits of modem
discrimination doctrine and citing legal scholarship critiquing those limits).
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I. LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON THE
COMPLEXITY OF PERCEIVING GENDER BIAS
A number of cognitive and motivational processes exist that make it
difficult for a person to see herself as the target of gender bias. This section
surveys some of these barriers and explores how they intersect to submerge
and complicate individual awareness of gender bias and its influence on
women's lives.
A. The Belief in a "Just World," the Ideology of Individual
Responsibility, and the Reluctance to Blame Others
Social psychologists have identified a psychological drive to
believe that the world is fundamentally "just" in the sense of meritocratic,
such that people get what they deserve and are not held back by unfair
considerations such as gender or race.33 Attribution of negative outcomes to
discrimination clashes with this belief in a "just world." As a result, women
and people of color who strongly believe in a "just world" tend to discount
discrimination as an explanation for negative outcomes and instead blame
themselves.34 For example, researchers have found that the more that
members of lower-status groups (specifically, in this research, Latino/a
Americans and women) "endorsed the ideology of individual mobility (e.g.,
agreed with statements such as "advancement in American society is
possible for individuals of all ethnic groups"), the less likely they were to
report that they personally, or members of their group, were targets of
discrimination. 35 The influence of "just world" ideology on perceptions of
discrimination is heightened when, as is often the case, there is ambiguity
33See, e.g., Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of PersonalDeprivation,supra note 28, at
159-63. As originally conceived, the "just world" theory had its primary analytical force in
explaining peoples' reaction to the suffering of others. Later work has demonstrated the

force of the theory in also explaining how people make sense of their own suffering. Id. at
159-60.
34Id. at 161. Because the belief in a "just world" tends to suppress perceptions of

discrimination both at the collective and the individual level, it does not explain the
disconnect noted above between perceiving discrimination against one's social group while
denying any personal experience with discrimination. On that score, see infra notes 46-56

and accompanying text (discussing the belief in individual responsibility and the reluctance
to blame others).
35Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 82. The authors add:

"They were also less likely to blame discrimination when a higher-status confederate
(European American; man) rejected them for a desirable role." Id.
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about why a particular negative outcome occurred.36 When prejudices are
subtle and circumstances ambiguous, adherence to "just world" ideology is
especially likely to lead members of stigmatized groups to favor internal
explanations over bias as the reason for a poor outcome. 37
Interestingly, adherence to "just world" ideology does not have the
same effect on perceptions of discrimination for all social groups. Members
of high-status social groups, such as white males, are more likely to
attribute a negative outcome to personal discrimination when they adhere to
the belief in a "just world., 38 Accordingly, experimental research has found
that while adherence to a belief in a "just world" lessens the likelihood that
members of lower-status groups will perceive discrimination when rejected
for a position by higher-status group members, members of higher-status
groups who endorse "just world" ideology are more likely to blame
39
discrimination for their rejection by a member of a lower-status group.

36Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of PersonalDeprivation,supra note 28, at 163.
37Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 230 ("[A]mbiguous

situations appear to be especially difficult for members of stigmatized groups. Because they
disguise prejudice, they create uncertainty and interfere with the target's ability to discount
their own role in producing negative outcomes.").
38 See Kaiser & Major, supra note 25, at 812; Major et al., Prejudice and Self
Esteem, supra note 31, at 82.
39As Kaiser and Major explain,

Because endorsing this meritocratic worldview results in seeing lowstatus group members as deserving of their poor outcomes, the more
low-status group members endorse these beliefs, the more they will
minimize the extent to which they face discrimination

....

In contrast,

because endorsing the meritocratic worldview leaves members of highstatus groups feeling entitled to their privileged position, the more they
endorse the worldview, the more sensitive they will be towards
perceiving signs of reverse discrimination. In other words, endorsing the
meritocratic worldview leads members of high-status groups to
anticipate preferential treatment (because they assume they have greater
abilities), and they will feel threatened and slighted when members of
low-status groups receive better treatment than they do . .

.

. Hence,

seeing their negative outcomes as stemming from reverse discrimination
can be one way to maintain their faith in the worldview that conveys that
they should be at the top of the social hierarchy.
Kaiser & Major, supra note 25, at 808-09 (internal citations omitted).
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Because the belief in a "just world" is pervasive, this ideology
exerts a strong influence on perceptions of discrimination. 40 It may be
especially powerful within institutions highly steeped in the ideology of
merit, such as the legal profession in general and the legal academy in
particular.4 ' Settings where the belief in meritocracy is especially
pronounced discourage perceptions of bias against those who do not rise to
the top.
As defined above, the belief in a "just world" is infused with the
ideology of individual responsibility. This ideology appeals to many people
because it enables them to believe that they have control over their
destiny.42 Seeing oneself as a victim of discrimination contradicts that
belief. The ideology of individual responsibility "turn[s] the word victim
into a synonym for failure or irresponsibility.'43 This belief system creates
an aversion to being perceived as a victim of discrimination, especially
when one's victim status is linked to membership in a social group whose
members are stigmatized and devalued.44
The belief in individual responsibility enables a person to
acknowledge that members of her social group might experience
discrimination, yet preserves her individual agency by discounting the
possibility that she herself has experienced discrimination.45 For example,
40 See id. at 806-08 (describing "the meritocratic worldview" and its prevalence in

mainstream United States culture).
" See id at 810-12 (discussing research finding that low-status groups' attributions
to discrimination decrease when targets are first primed with messages highlighting a
meritocratic worldview, and concluding that "environments where the meritocratic
worldview is pervasive (such as meritocracy-based employment institutions), might lead
members of devalued groups to minimize discrimination and members of high-status groups
to become more sensitive to signs of reverse discrimination"). See also Martha S. West,

Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failureto Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L.

REv. 67, 139-43 (1994) (discussing the prevalence of the "myth of meritocracy" in the
academy and how it operates to justify the unequal position of women faculty).
42 Kaiser & Major, supra note 25, at 808 (discussing the psychological benefits
derived from endorsement of the meritocratic worldview, including a sense of control over
one's destiny).
43Magley et al., Outcomes of Self Labeling, supra note 27, at 392.

44Id.at 392-93; Carolyn L. Hafer & James M. Olson, Beliefs in a Just World,
Discontent, and Assertive Actions by Working Women, 19 PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 30, 35 (1993) (explaining that people who hold strong beliefs in a just world tend to
minimize discrimination and blame themselves for poor outcomes).
45 See supra note 42.
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women who are sexually harassed might resist labeling their experience as
such to preserve their belief in individual responsibility and avoid the
stigmatized identity of a harassment victim. 46 Likewise, women's generally

low level of apparent dissatisfaction with their lower pay-a phenomenon
that is described below47 -may reflect their aversion to being cast as
victims if they attribute the disparity to discrimination. 48 In my experiences
representing young women in Title IX challenges to unequal athletic
opportunity, I was often struck by how frequently female athletes in these
cases went out of their way to proclaim that they were not feminists.49 In
their unprompted disclaimers, I sensed an anxiety about being seen as
victims for bringing a discrimination suit, and a desire to avoid a deeper
stigma of victimhood that a broader challenge to sexism might entail. Even
some young women who identify as feminists emphatically deny that they
personally have experienced sexism-a phenomenon I have often witnessed
among students in my gender law classes. Some social psychologists
suggest that the desire to see oneself as an agent with control over one's
life, rather than as a victim of external forces, best explains the gap between
the perception of widespread discrimination against one's social group and
the widespread denial of personal discrimination.5 °
A corollary to the belief in individual responsibility is the
reluctance to blame another person for a negative outcome in one's own
46 See Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining,supra note 27, at 1173 (explaining that
complaining of sexual harassment saddles the complainant with a "stigmatized" identity, and
quoting one manager as stating that "making a claim of sexual harassment 'is sort of like
rape, it tends to reflect as badly on the person filing the report as it does the person being
accused'); Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment
of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1374-75 (1992)
(discussing the "blame the victim" attitude that confronts women who are sexually harassed).
47 See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
48 Cf Brenda Major, From Social Inequality to PersonalEntitlement: The Role of
Social Comparisons, Legitimacy Appraisals, and Group Membership, 26 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 293, 325-26 (1994) [hereinafter Major, From Social Inequality]
(noting that when people are aware that women receive less pay than men, they tend to infer
that differences in individual marketability, including such factors as commitment to the
workforce and differences in job responsibilities, job performance, or job qualifications,
explain the pay disparity, even when they do not).
49 From 1992-1998, 1 was a staff attorney and then senior counsel at the National
Women's Law Center and was involved in litigating Title IX challenges to sex
discrimination in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics.
50 Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, supra note 28, at 164.
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life. Under common understanding and prevailing legal doctrine, if there is
sexism there must be a sexist. 51 Yet, social psychologists have observed an
emotional reluctance to perceive discrimination against a person when it
requires identifying an individual villain. 52 Termed "blame avoidance," this
phenomenon helps explain why women and other members of subordinated
social groups are more likely to recognize the existence of discrimination
against their social group but deny that they have personally experienced
it. 53 Recognizing systemic and anonymous discrimination against women
does not require an identifiable villain, but perceiving discrimination
against an individual woman does.
One study in support of the finding that people resist blaming
others under conditions suggestive of prejudice involved pairs of Canadian
students consisting of one white student and one aboriginal student who
were grouped together for the purpose of interacting in a get-acquainted
conversation. 54 Prior to the pairing, the white students were given a test that
measured racial prejudice. The students were then grouped into mixed-race
pairs for discussions. The researchers found that, in pairings with a highlyprejudiced white student, the aboriginal student left the interaction feeling
worse than the aboriginal students who were paired with less-prejudiced
whites, suggesting that the former set of interactions went badly.55
However, instead of blaming their white cohorts or perceiving them as
prejudiced, the aboriginal students who were paired with the high-prejudice
51 But

see Catharine

MacKinnon,

Difference and Dominance: On

Sex

Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 43-45 (1987)

(criticizing conventional discourse about sex discrimination for seeing gender inequality as a
problem of sexism). MacKinnon states:
If gender were merely a question of difference, sex inequality would be a
problem of mere sexism, of mistaken differentiation, of inaccurate
categorization of individuals. . . . But if gender is an inequality first,
constructed as a socially relevant differentiation in order to keep that
inequality in place, then sex inequality questions are questions of
systemic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not at all abstract and
is anything but a mistake.
Id.
52

See Crosby, The Denial of PersonalDiscrimination,supra note 28.

" See id
54 See Vorauer & Kumhyr, supra note 30.

" Id. at 716.
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white students blamed themselves for their negative feelings.56 From this
and other research, the authors surmised that people tend to think about
interactions with others in terms of what they reveal about themselves and
not what they reveal about the others. The authors interpreted their findings
to support the thesis that in everyday life members of low-status groups are
unlikely to detect prejudice, and instead internalize the negative emotions
produced by interactions that are tainted by prejudice.
The belief in a "just world," the belief in individual responsibility,
and the reluctance to blame others function together to discourage
perceptions of gender bias.
B. The Default Preference for Within-Group Comparisons and the
Effect on Individual Sense of Entitlement
Another factor that influences perceptions of bias is a person's
sense of entitlement. An individual's belief that she has experienced
discrimination is contingent upon her belief in the illegitimacy of her
current treatment. As social psychologist Brenda Major explains, "beliefs
about entitlement are a critical determinant of how members of social
groups react affectively, evaluatively, and behaviorally to their socially
distributed outcomes. 5 7 People are not likely to perceive bias or prejudice
unless they believe they are entitled to better treatment. Expectations about
the legitimacy of outcomes and one's sense of entitlement are thus critical
factors shaping the perception of bias.
These beliefs and expectations, in turn, are largely driven by the
process of social comparison.58 Information about what level of treatment
others receive enables people to form an opinion about what level of
treatment they deserve. Comparison to others provides necessary
benchmarks about what outcomes are possible and justifiable. The selection
of comparators is therefore critical in shaping perceptions of fairness and
bias.
Social scientists have found that people tend to compare themselves
to members of the same social group. In particular, working women tend to
compare their situations to those of other working women because of their
56 Id.

57See Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 48, at 293-94.
58 See id. at 298-300 (explaining that feelings of entitlement and deservingness
shape expectations and social justice perceptions, and that the process of comparison to
others is critical in determining beliefs about entitlement).
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59
perceived similarity, proximity, and ease of comparison with one another.
Structural features of the workplace, including vertical and horizontal
gender segregation, reinforce within-gender comparisons by bolstering the
similarity and proximity of women in the workforce. 60 The under-valuation
of women's work and the under-payment of women further reinforce a
sense of similarity among women for comparison purposes, as does
women's disproportionate share of home responsibilities. 6' At the same
time, women's different situations from men on these scores lessen the
salience of comparisons to men.6 2
Within-gender comparisons, while understandable, function to
legitimize and obscure gender differences in treatment. Working women
who compare themselves to other working women develop a diminished
sense of entitlement.63 As a result, the very existence of systematic
discrimination against women as a group makes individual instances of bias
harder to detect because the group experience affects the level of treatment
individual women perceive as normal and legitimate. 64 At the same time,
men tend to compare themselves to other men, leading them to expect the
continuation of the privileges that correspond to their gender.65
A similar effect on women's sense of entitlement follows from the
related tendency of individuals to compare their current situations with their

59 See Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of PersonalDeprivation, supra note 28, at 16667; Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 48, at 302.
60 See Major, From Social Inequality,supra note 48, at 314.

61Id. at 314-15.
62 Id. at 315. See also id. at 303 ("[P]eople tend to make intragroup rather than
intergroup comparisons

when estimating what they deserve

because of the greater

availability, and assumed greater similarity and diagnosticity, of the former.").
63 See id. at 320-21 (explaining that women's default within-group comparison
reference point leads to lower expectations for pay than men have).
64 See id. at 294.
65 See id. at 321-22. Major notes:

Women and men estimate their personal deserving against a (same) sexstereotyped judgment standard. .

.

. Because women and people doing

'women's jobs' are typically paid less than men and people doing 'men's
jobs,' women estimate their personal deserving and evaluate their
outcomes against a lower reference standard for pay than do men.
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past experiences. A person's past experience shapes her expectations and
sense of legitimacy with respect to her present treatment. This too tends to
legitimize and render invisible systemic discrimination. For example, a
woman's prior pay has a strong influence on her expectations about the
level of pay she currently deserves. 66 Since women on average receive less
pay than men, the comparison to past experience is likely to suppress a
woman's sense of entitlement with respect to current pay. In this way,
individual discrimination becomes self-reinforcing: people who have
experienced discrimination believe that they deserve less and do not
perceive persisting disadvantage as discriminatory or illegitimate, while
persons with privilege have a strong sense of entitlement to continued
favorable treatment. 67 Together, gender-specific
comparisons and
comparison to68one's prior experience obscure systemic bias and legitimize
the status quo.
These comparison processes help explain women's suppressed
sense of entitlement, which social scientists have amply documented. In one
study in which women and men were asked to set their pay for performing a
specified task without information on expected or baseline rates, women
paid themselves only sixty-one percent of what men paid themselves.6 9 In a
follow-up study in which men and women were paid the same amount to
perform a task but were told to work as long as they believed appropriate,
the women worked one-third longer than the men in the study. 70 The
evidence suggests that the use of within-gender comparison standards is "by

66 See id.at 322. The potency of the comparison to one's own past experience may

even overcome a bias toward within-group comparisons. For example, when well-paid
women were reminded of their prior pay, which was equal to men's, they paid themselves
equally to the men when given the task of setting their pay for a specific work task. Id.
67 See id.
at 307-08, 321-22.
68 See id. at 303 ("[P]eople typically feel they deserve the same treatment or

outcomes that they have received in the past or that others like themselves receive.").
69 See Jost, Negative Illusions, supra note 28, at 404. See also Major, From Social
Inequality, supra note 48, at 313-14 (discussing research explaining women's paradoxical

satisfaction with their pay by their lower sense of entitlement to higher pay). Interestingly,
this finding holds even when the amount that women pay themselves does not come out of
what another person receives, thus refuting women's allegedly greater inclination toward
caretaking of others as a possible explanation. Id.at 315. These research findings have also
been extended beyond lab conditions and generalize to women's pay expectations in the real
world. Id.at 317.
70 See Jost, Negative Illusions, supra note 28, at 404-05.
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71
far the strongest predictor of gender differences in pay expectations., The
tendency to engage in within-gender comparisons also shapes gendered
expectations about the distribution of household responsibilities. Working
women generally accept unequal household and caretaking labor as
legitimate, even while acknowledging that they perform far more such work
than their male partners.72 Social psychologists view women's general
contentment with their objectively worse job status, pay levels, and
household responsibilities as "paradoxical," a product of gender differences
in feelings of entitlement.73
The default baseline of drawing comparisons within one's social
group has a normalizing effect that downplays or obscures the ways in
which our lives are influenced by gender. In her recent essay, The Shadow
of Professor Kingsfield. Contemporary Dilemmas Facing Women Law
Professors, law professor Martha Chamallas offers one example of how the
tendency toward gender-specific comparisons might suppress consciousness
of gender bias on a law faculty.7 4 She describes how women on a law
faculty turn to their friends, who are likely to be other women, in comparing
raises and salaries, which are unpublished at most law schools. She
contrasts the normalizing influence of such comparisons with her own
observations of large salary disparities on law faculties where some of the
highest salaries go to male faculty members who have only average
performance records 7 5
Gender-specific comparisons also might operate to facilitate bias in
the legal academy in other ways. In faculty hiring meetings, women
candidates are often implicitly grouped together for comparison with other
women candidates, competing for an unarticulated "woman's slot" among
the openings for new faculty and implying an incommensurability between

71See Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 48, at 321.
72

See id. at 296 (explaining that gender, more than any other factor, explains

women's disproportionate share of household labor, and yet women in general are not more
dissatisfied than men in their relationships and do not perceive their labor overload as
unfair). See also KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 236-37 (4th ed. 2006) (citing research finding that

women do substantially more housework and family caretaking than men and research
finding that only a minority of women (one quarter to one third) see this as unfair).

73 See Major, From Social Inequality,supra note 48, at 294-96.
74 Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield, supra note 8, at 203.
"5ld. at 204.

PerceivingSubtle Sexism

2007]

697

male and female candidates.76 Similarly, Professor Derrick Bell has
observed an unspoken ceiling on law faculties for African-American hires,
in which schools effectively section off "diversity slots," and foreclose
serious consideration of African-American candidates once a token level of
minority representation has been achieved. 77 Although within-group
comparisons might be defended as a necessary by-product of attention to
race and gender in the process of promoting diversity and guarding against
institutional racism and sexism, such comparisons often operate to reinforce
separate and suppressed expectations of excellence for women and people
of color and effectively limit the number of slots for which women and
minority candidates actually compete.
While troubling, I do not believe that the answer to this "doublebind" is to substitute the pretense of gender- and race-neutrality for
78
consideration of race and gender diversity in the hiring process. 78 The very
intractability and invisibility of race and gender bias in the academy has
required aggressive attention to diversity just to give women and people of
color a fair chance at equal, not special, consideration. 79 Rather, we should
increase our vigilance in spotting subtle forms of bias to make sure that
women and people of color are not marginalized either by the pretense of
race- and gender-blind hiring or as an unintended consequence of attending
to race and gender in the process of seeking greater diversity.8 °
existing
and
legitimizing
expectations
suppressing
By
like the
comparisons,
within-group
to
make
arrangements, the tendency
"just world" ideology and its corollaries, has an inhibitory effect on
perceiving and challenging gender bias.

76

For example, I recall instances where colleagues expressed judgments about

female candidates with the opening, "among the women, I like [candidate X]."
77 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Application of the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law

FacultyHiring Policies, 10 NOVA L. J. 319 (1986).
78 For

an interesting discussion of the ubiquitous "double-bind" in feminist theory

more generally, see Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1699, 1699-1704 (1990).
79 See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 1, at 490-91 (discussing their research showing
that aggressive affirmative action "was needed just to assure that faculties identified and
hired women who were equal to the white men they so readily hired").

Ruth Anna Putnam, Justice in Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1797, 1807 (1990)
("Knowledge of obstacles is not itself an obstacle unless it leads to defeatism; for
pragmatists it serves as a spur to seek a way to overcome those obstacles.").
80 Cf
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C. Cognitive Barriers to Perceiving Individual Instances of Bias on a
Case-by-Case Basis
The limits of information processing further obstruct the perception
of gender bias on an individual level. Cognitive limitations impair our
ability to process information in many respects. Social psychologists who
study the perception of discrimination have found that people have great
difficulty recognizing individual instances of discrimination under normal
conditions of information gathering. 8
One difficulty stems from people's reluctance to infer
discrimination in an individual case where multiple criteria, which allow for
multiple interpretations, are used . Faye Crosby, a social psychologist who
studies perceptions of discrimination, offers an example to illustrate this
problem. When examining a pair of male and female comparators who
receive widely varying salaries, and knowing their ratings with respect to
the four factors used to determine employee salary (job level, seniority,
education, and motivational rating), slight variations among the
comparators on any of the four criteria make it impossible to tell for certain
whether the pay gap is attributable to gender. Only when presented with a
more extensive group picture, showing an overall pay gap between
numerous male and female employees, are observers likely to perceive sex
discrimination, given that none of the male/female comparators perfectly
match up on the relevant criteria. 83 Aggregate information is thus needed
for the observer to discern inconsistencies in possible sex-neutral
explanations and to react skeptically to hypothesized justifications.
In real life, however, people rarely have access to the kind of
aggregate information that Crosby describes as necessary to enable the
recognition of sex discrimination in individual cases. Usually, people know
solely of their own personal situations, and perhaps a few anecdotal others.
Rarely, and usually only through discovery after filing a lawsuit, do people
have access to the kind of organization-wide comparisons that are most
helpful in enabling the perception of discrimination.
Perhaps more notable, it is not just what is known that matters, but
how the information is presented that determines the likelihood of
81 See Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, supra note 28, at 377;

Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 81.
82 See Crosby, The Denial of PersonalDiscrimination,supra note 28, at 377.
83 See id. at 378. See also Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 48, at 332 ("It
is easier to see discrimination on the collective level than on an individual level.").
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perceiving bias. People are more likely to perceive instances of
discrimination when they are shown information in the aggregate, all at
once, in an across-the-board comparison of the treatment of women and
men, and less likely to do so when the same information trickles in
piecemeal, presented on an individual case-by-case basis. 84 In other words,
formatting is critical. A leading study of this phenomenon used male
college students who read case studies of a company and were asked to
determine whether the company discriminated against women.8 5 The
subjects who read the materials that were formatted on a case-by-case basis
perceived less sex discrimination than those who read the same materials
presented in an all-at-once, whole-picture format.8 6 Crosby explains that
when information is presented in piecemeal fashion, the reviewer
hypothesizes rational, nondiscriminatory reasons that might explain each
individual case. But when the same information is shown in the aggregate
and all at once, the viewer finds hypothetical neutral explanations less
credible. 87 This information-processing bias operates at the cognitive,
subconscious level, regardless of a person's conscious views about
gender. 88
Unfortunately, life more often replicates the conditions under which
the cognitive limits of information processing are likely to obscure the
recognition of gender discrimination. Rarely does evidence of aggregate,
across-the-board discrimination present itself all at once, in a neatly
packaged format. Rather, like the conditions unfavorable for recognizing
discrimination, evidence commonly dribbles in piecemeal over time,
usually in the form of individual stories or anecdotes.
D. The Reluctance to Challenge Bias and the Effect on Perception
The social psychology literature on perceiving and claiming
discrimination usually treats these processes as separate and distinct.
However, in important respects, the processes that complicate perception
84See Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 81 (2003).
85 See Faye Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases in the Perception of Discrimination:
The Importance of Format, 14 SEx ROLES 637 (1986).
86

Id. at 644.

87

Id. at

645.

88 As Crosby explains, "[t]he cognitive biases that we have demonstrated operate
among the 'nice guys' as surely as among the villains." Id. at 646.
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intersect with and are reinforced by the difficulties that encumber the
decision of whether to complain of discrimination.
Contrary to the prevailing myth that a person who actually suffered
discrimination would have complained, in reality, most people exhibit a
deep reluctance to challenge discrimination." 9 Nevertheless, the myth is
strong and shapes public reaction to discrimination accounts. It was
displayed in full force during the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings,
which spent an inordinate amount of time and energy dissecting Professor
Hill's failure to complain about the alleged harassment, and determining
what bearing that failure90 had on her credibility as a witness and on the
reliability of her account.
The reality is that targets of discrimination rarely complain of
discrimination, and for good reason. The costs of complaining are
enormous, both in terms of the social costs and the consequences for current
and future career opportunities. 91 While lost job opportunities and the fear
of retaliation are generally the most frequently cited reasons for not
complaining, the role of social costs is important as well. 92 Concerns about
self-presentation and the reactions of others significantly affect the decision
of whether to challenge discrimination.93 People have a general desire to be
liked and to appear competent in their professional lives, but people who
complain of discrimination are generally neither well-liked nor perceived as
89 See generally Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation,90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 28-29 (2005)
(summarizing and citing evidence documenting the low likelihood of reporting or

challenging sexual harassment or sexist behavior).
90See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love,

Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (1992) (discussing how
Professor Hill's failure to leave her job or file a complaint was used against her in the
hearings); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence
Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1402-03 (1992) (explaining how Professor
Hill's failure to report the harassment was erroneously used to undermine her credibility).
91 Brake, supra note 89, at 32-36 (describing and citing extensive research

documenting the high costs of complaining about discrimination).
92

See id. at 36-42 (discussing the social costs). See also Pamela Hewitt Loy, The

Extent and Effects of the Sexual Harassment of Working Women, 17 Soc. Focus 31, 40
(1984) [hereinafter Loy, The Extent and Effects] (describing the results of a study of sexually

harassed women finding that the most common negative response to vocalizing harassment
was social stigmatization from coworkers, including ignoring and not supporting the women,
and that these reactions were very harmful in affecting the work environment and in further
stigmatizing the target).
93 Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of PersonalDeprivation,supra note 28, at 168-71.
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competent. 94 Instead, they are often disliked, viewed as troublemakers, or
seen as having problematic personalities. 95 Objective evidence that the
claimant did, in fact, experience discrimination does not protect people
from being disliked when they complain of discrimination. In studies
examining predominantly white subjects' reactions to an account in which
an African American student blamed poor test results either on
discrimination or some nondiscriminatory cause, the subjects disliked the
students who blamed discrimination, even when presented with objective
evidence that the student had, in fact, experienced racial discrimination in
the gradingof the test.96 These findings were replicated in follow-up studies
in which subjects read accounts of an African American who failed to
97
receive a job offer after an interview with a clearly prejudiced interviewer.
Again, the subjects disliked the African Americans who blamed
discrimination for the failure to receive a job offer, even when it was clear
that the interviewer was prejudiced.
Social psychology research has documented a similar disapproval
of women who complain of sexism. One notable study found that male
subjects liked a woman less when she challenged as sexist a male
colleague's remarks that really were sexist, but did not dislike her if she
challenged as sexist other remarks that had no apparent connection to
gender. 98 That is, challenging sexism when it is not really there does not
provoke the same degree of hostility, perhaps because such challenges are
easily dismissed as non-threatening compared to challenges to sexism that

94 Id.
95 See Brake, supra note 89, at 32. See also White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe
R.R., 364 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding a retaliation claim and noting that the

plaintiffs employer identified her as a "troublemaker"
discrimination), aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).

for complaining of gender

See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of
Making Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 261-62
(2001).
96

97 See Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The
Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination,6 GROUP PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP REL. 227 (2003).
98 See Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected, supra note 26, at 574-75. See also
Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally): Reactions to
Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 532, 541
(2003) (describing the results of a study finding that women's confrontations of sexism
generally provoked feelings of hostility or amusement rather than guilt or remorse).
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clearly have merit. 99 This and other research demonstrates that the fear that
trigger social and occupational penalties is
claiming discrimination 0will
0
well-grounded in reality.
Despite this reality, people persist in believing that a true victim of
discrimination would forcefully complain, and that they themselves would
do so if faced with such a situation. One of the more enlightening studies
debunking this myth used two groups of female subjects to examine
women's beliefs about how they would respond if they experienced
discrimination, and then contrasted these beliefs with women's actual
responses to discrimination. 0 1 In this study, one group of women read an
account of a job interview in which a male interviewer asked a female
interviewee several sexually harassing and discriminatory questions. 10 2 The
women were then asked how they would have responded had they been
subjected to such questions. The women overwhelmingly predicted that
they would have responded assertively, by refusing to answer the 1questions,
03
confronting the interviewer, or reporting him to a higher authority.
The second part of the study used a different group of female
subjects, this time placing them in an actual interview with a male
interviewer in which they believed they were being evaluated for a research
assistant position. 10 4 These women were then subjected to the same
discriminatory questions featured in the earlier part of the study. When
99 See Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected, supra note 26, at 575 ("[P]erhaps [it

was] because her unprovoked remark was dismissed as without legitimate cause. On the
other hand, the target woman's response to the clearly sexist remark was legitimate, and as a
consequence perhaps made especially salient the fact that she was transgressing her gender
role by standing up to a man in that situation.").
100See, e.g., Loy, The Extent and Effects, supra note 92, at 42 (describing the

results of a study showing that ignoring sexual harassment was a safer strategy in terms of
avoiding negative outcomes than verbalizing the problem to others, including going to a
supervisor, addressing a sexual harassment committee, or taking legal action).
101See Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender
Harassment,57 J. Soc. ISSUES 15 (2001).
102 Id. at 20-21.
103 A

strong majority of the women in this part-of the study (sixty-eight percent)

predicted they would refuse to answer at least one of the three sexist questions asked by the
interviewer, with sixty-two percent saying they would ask the interviewer why he asked the
question or tell him the question was inappropriate, and with twenty-eight percent saying
they would take more drastic measures such as immediately leaving the room or confronting

the interviewer. Id. at 21.
"04 Id. at 21-23.
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actually subjected to the sexually harassing and discriminatory questions,
not one of the subjects confronted the interviewer or refused to answer the
question.10 5 Instead, the most common response was to simply answer the
question.' °6 Some interviewees tried to deflect the question° 7 or politely asked

why the interviewer was asking a particular question. 10 However, even

these interviewees ultimately answered the questions without further
objection. 0 8 Follow-up debriefing, confirmed by observations of the
interviews themselves, revealed that the most common emotional response
at the time was fear, in contrast to the anger that the women in the first part
of the study predicted they would feel.' 0 9 The study illustrates the stark
contrast between how people believe they would respond to discrimination
and how they actually respond when they experience it. 110
The gap between expectation and reality creates a dissonance for
people who experience prejudice but simultaneously feel a powerful pull
not to confront it. In this process, the pressure not to confront bias can have
a suppressive effect on the perception of bias. Unless a person is prepared to
challenge any bias she perceives, the perception of bias sits uncomfortably
with the person's expectation that she would react swiftly and sharply to
confront the perpetrator if she experienced discrimination. Minimizing the
incident or denying that the experience was in fact discriminatory thus
enables the target to excuse or justify her inaction."' By encouraging the
105

More than half of the women ignored the sexist nature of the remark and

answered the question, and slightly over one-third politely asked why he had asked the
question, but answered it nonetheless. Id. at 23-24. Of this latter group, eighty percent waited
until after the interview was over to ask why he had asked the question, and simply
responded to it at the moment it was asked. None of the women refused to answer a question,
confronted the interviewer, or left the room. Id.

106 id.
107 Id. at 24.
108 Id.

109 Id. at 25.
110 Other studies have produced similar findings. See, e.g., Janet K. Swim & Lauri

L. Hyers, Excuse Me-What Did You Just Say?!: Women 's Public and PrivateResponses to
Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68 (1999) (comparing women's
predicted confrontational responses to a male colleague's sexist remarks with their actual
silence in the face of such behavior).
'11 Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining, supra note 27, at 1171 (describing an
"internal dialogue gauging whether one should be and can afford to be aggrieved by the
action" and explaining how and why sexually harassed women often choose "a story that
explains away one's own impotence").
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target to revise and recheck her perceptions to ease the clash between
expected and actual behavior,
the failure to confront may subtly undermine
1 2
the perception of bias.
The hefty pressures not to confront discrimination operate to
submerge consciousness of gender bias at the collective level as well. Social
psychologist John T. Jost discusses the problem of "pluralistic ignorance,"
which occurs when individuals suppress or deny their awareness of a
problem in part because they interpret the silence of others to confirm its
absence." 3 When people are reluctant to publicly identify or challenge
gender bias within institutions, their silence contributes to a normalcy in
which individuals interpret their own experiences and perceptions
consistently with that collective silence. In this way, the silence of others
operates
to inhibit and potentially undermine an individual's perception of
4
bias.' 1
E. A Complication: The Relationship Between Self-Esteem and
Perceiving Bias
The processes described above all operate in the direction of
submerging awareness of gender bias. However, one motivational incentive
that surfaces in the literature works in the other direction, possibly
encouraging attributions of bias. Some researchers have hypothesized that
attributions to discrimination might serve to protect and preserve selfesteem.1 5 In this account, the drive for self-esteem creates an incentive for
people to blame negative outcomes on discrimination in order to avoid the
112See Olsen & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation,supra note 28, at 164

(citing theorists who explain the gap between perceptions of discrimination against one's
group and oneself because such denial "allows the disadvantaged individuals to justify
inaction against the more powerful"). Cf. Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem, supranote
31, at 87 ("[O]ne method of coping is cognitive reappraisal-redefining an event as less
threatening than it was originally appraised as being.").
113 Jost, Negative Illusions, supra note 28, at 406-07.
114 For one example from a reported decision of how collective silence is used to

undermine an individual's perception of bias, see Davis v. Monroe County Bd of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 635 (1999) (reciting an alleged fact in a sexual harassment case that the school
principal responded to a student's allegation of sexual harassment by asking why she "was
the only one complaining"). Cf Quinn, The Paradoxof Complaining, supra note 27, at 1155
("Like so many gendered and sexually related harms, if you don't talk about it, it hasn't
happened.").
115See Kaiser & Major, supra note 25, at 803 (summarizing research); Major et al.,
Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 220-22 (surveying literature).
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blow to self-esteem that would occur if they located the blame internally.
This theory is worth some discussion because of its potential to offset the
above processes and support the alternative hyper-vigilance thesis.
The more social psychologists study the connection between
attributions to discrimination and the effect on self-esteem, the more
complicated that relationship appears. 1 6 There is much debate within the
literature about how conceptions of self-esteem enter into and interact with
the process of perceiving discrimination. Some literature does support the
view that blaming negative outcomes on discrimination has a positive effect
on self-esteem. 1 7 Under this view, individuals might favor attributions to
discrimination as a way of protecting self-esteem from the damage that
alternative, internally-directed explanations might cause.
However, recent work has cast doubt on such a simplistic
understanding of how self-esteem interacts with perceptions of
discrimination. Some researchers have attempted to more finely parse selfesteem, separating one's sense of self with respect to individual
achievement from one's sense of self as a social actor. 1 8 While attributions
to discrimination may preserve positive feelings about one's abilities, they
may harm a more socially oriented self-esteem by undermining one's sense
of self as a social actor."1 9 This negative effect on social self-esteem is
especially pronounced for individuals who strongly identify with their
social group.120 This complication may call into question the causal
116 See Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 222-23

(summarizing existing literature); Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 31

(positing a transactional model in which numerous situational factors mediate the
relationship between perceiving discrimination and self-esteem); Brenda Major et al., It's
Not My Fault: When and Why Attributions to Prejudice Protect Self-Esteem, 29 PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 772, 779-80 (2003) [hereinafter Major et al., It's Not My Fault].
117 See, e.g., Major et al., It's Not My Fault, supra note 116 (citing studies showing
a positive correlation between perceiving discrimination and protecting self-esteem, and
explaining their finding that attributing negative outcomes to discrimination promotes selfesteem by locating the "fault" with an external cause rather than an internal one; e.g., the
professor excluded me because of sexism vs. the professor excluded me because he thinks I
am stupid). Interestingly, however, even when attributions to discrimination shelter selfesteem, they do not protect against feelings of hostility or anxiety. Id.

118 See Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 222-23; Major
et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 78, 84-85.
"19 Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination, supra note 9, at 222 (citing
research showing that perceiving bias hurts self-esteem since one's social group membership
is an important part of the self).

120Major

et al., Prejudice andSelf-Esteem, supra note 31, at 93.
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relationship between preserving self-esteem and perceiving discrimination
altogether. As explained later in this Article,' 21 strongly identifying with
one's social group increases the likelihood of perceiving bias on the basis of
membership in that group. Yet, having a strong identification with one's
social group makes it more likely that perceiving oneself as a target of bias
will hurt self-esteem.12 Thus, strong social group identification correlates
both with an increased likelihood of perceiving bias and with an increased
likelihood that perceiving bias will harm self-esteem. If the desire to
protect self-esteem strongly motivated people to perceive discrimination,
one would expect people who strongly identify with their social group to be
less likely to perceive discrimination, since for this group, perceiving bias
hurts a core aspect of their self-esteem. The influence of social group
identification on perceiving bias, and its role in sorting out the self-esteem
consequences for persons who do so, suggests reason to doubt that the goal
of protecting self-esteem strongly encourages the perception of
discrimination.
The most recent work in this area suggests a complicated
relationship between self-esteem and perceiving bias, one largely dependent
on the extent of the discrimination and the clarity and openness of prejudice
cues.12 3 Self-esteem does not benefit when people perceive that they have
experienced systematic and pervasive discrimination. 24 Any positive effect
on self-esteem from picking prejudice over an alternative, internal
explanation is substantially limited 25to where the perceived prejudice
involves a discrete and specific event.
The subtlety of prejudice cues also affects the relationship between
self-esteem and blaming discrimination. People who perceive sexism when
exposed to obvious signs of prejudice show higher self-esteem than those
26
who perceive prejudice when exposed to more subtle signs of prejudice.'
121See

infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.

122 See Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 93-94.

123Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 221 (explaining

that the complex relationship between perceiving discrimination and protecting self-esteem
is best explained by situational factors, especially how blatant the prejudice was and whether
the circumstances were ambiguous).
124 Id.at 230.
125Id. at 229; Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 90-91.

126
Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 229. In this study,
the condition for ambiguous prejudice cues involved a creativity test where a female cohort
says to the subject: "You know, I have friends who were in this study, and they told me that
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When prejudice cues are subtle or ambiguous, perceiving sexism does not
27
exclude other explanations that simultaneously locate fault internally.'
Under ambiguous conditions, people tend to infer multiple causes for
negative outcomes, finding prejudice and internal shortcomings jointly
are present, selfresponsible.1 28 Thus, when uncertainty and ambiguity
29
esteem is not protected by perceiving prejudice. 1
The bottom line is that people who blame discrimination for the bad
outcomes in their lives do not necessarily receive a self-esteem boost. The
connection between perceiving bias and protecting self-esteem is
complicated, to say the least, and it does not appear strong enough to rebut
processes described
the under-perception thesis or offset the effects of the
130
bias.
of
perceptions
suppress
to
operate
above which

the guy doing the evaluating totally grades guys and girls differently." Id. at 224. In the overt
prejudice group, the female cohort says: "You know, I have friends who were in this study,
and they told me that the guy doing the evaluating is totally prejudiced. He never picks a girl
to be the team leader-he always picks a guy." Id. Under both conditions (and a third
condition with no prejudice cue), the male evaluator assigns low grades to the female
subjects, who are then evaluated for how they explain their poor results and the effect on
their self-esteem. Id.at 224-25. See also Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note
31, at 91 (discussing the relationship between the intensity of prejudice cues and the effect
on self-esteem from perceiving prejudice).
127

Major et al., It's Not My Fault, supra note 116, at 775 (noting that "attributions

to discrimination and self-blame are not necessarily inversely related" and "[p]erceiving that
another person is prejudiced against one's group does not preclude blaming a negative
outcome on aspects of oneself, such as one's lack of effort").
128

Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 229.

129

Id. As the authors explain:

Uncertainty is an affectively unpleasant state, and may lead to reduced
well-being relative to being confident that one's outcomes are due to
prejudice. When one is faced with blatant prejudice, in contrast, there is
no uncertainty about the cause of one's outcomes. It is clear that the
proper attribution for negative outcomes is prejudice rather than one's
lack of ability.
Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
130

Id.at 230 ("This study adds to growing evidence that it is overly simplistic to

assert that attributing negative outcomes to prejudice protects self-esteem .... Ironically, the
self-protection component of making attributions to discrimination applies most clearly
when the situation is unambiguously prejudiced .... In the real world, ambiguity is likely to
be the rule, rather than the exception.").
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F. The Limits of Generalizing: Why Do People Ever Perceive
Discrimination?
In considering the psychological forces that constrain the ability of
individuals to perceive subtle forms of bias, it is important to keep in mind
that these processes are not a monolithic set of constraints that have the
same effect on all persons, nor are they insurmountable. Notwithstanding
the processes described above that create "static" or "interference," some
people do perceive that they have experienced gender or race bias. This
reality raises an important question: why are some people more likely than
others to interpret an event as discriminatory?
Existing research identifies two factors that increase the likelihood
that an individual will perceive bias: a skepticism of "just world" ideology
and a high level of group-identification with members of one's social group.
With respect to the first factor, not everyone shares a strong belief in the
existence of a "just world."' 13 1 Although more research is needed to
determine what influences individuals' adherence to "just world" ideology,
some research has found that different social groups respond to "just world"
ideology differently. For example, African Americans as a group are less
132
likely than women as a group to believe in "just world" ideology.
However, this finding highlights a larger problem with the research in this
area. The focus on monolithic social groups misses important lessons that
have emerged from the critique of intersectionality by Critical Race
Feminists. By examining women and African Americans as discrete groups,
the research is unable to account for how race and gender together may
shape adherence to "just world" ideology and influence perceptions of bias.
More sophisticated attention to the intersection of race and gender by
researchers might help further our understanding of how and why some
people come to believe more ardently in "just world" ideology than

others.133
The second factor, an individual's level of social group
identification and feelings of solidarity, also emerges as an important
influence on the likelihood of perceiving discrimination based on social
131Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 48, at 335.
132

See id at 336-37.

133Cf Tanya Kateri Hernndez, The Intersectionality of Lived Experience and
Anti-Discrimination Empirical Research, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RESEARCH, supra note 26, 325, 325-35 (criticizing the lack of attention to the intersection of

race and gender in social science research on sexual harassment and calling for greater
attention to intersectionality in social science research on discrimination).
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group membership. Strongly identifying with one's social group broadens
one's perspective beyond the individual level and encourages comparisons
with out-group members, thereby facilitating perceptions of bias. 3 4 In one
study, the extent to which women identified with women as a social group
significantly affected their likelihood of perceiving discrimination under
conditions where prejudice cues were ambiguous. 35 Women who had
declared in an earlier part of the study that their gender was a significant
element in their social identity were significantly more likely to perceive
that they had been subjected to subtly sexist treatment than women who
ranked gender lower as an element of their identity.
This finding is hardly surprising. One would expect, for example,
women who call themselves feminists and strongly identify with other
women to be more inclined to see gender bias in daily life. Notably,
however, this research does not lend support to those critics who blame
feminism's emphasis on gender identity for turning everything into a gender
issue. The study's most interesting finding was that having a strong
identification with women as a social group had no effect on attributions of
bias when prejudice cues were either blatant or absent. 136 Thus, an affinity
with one's social group plays a strong role in influencing perceptions of
subtle bias, but does not induce perceptions of bias where there is no
evidence of prejudice.
Although the findings on social group solidarity are helpful in
developing an understanding of why some people infer bias from a situation
while others in the same social group do not, this research too is limited by
its failure to more finely parse social group identity formation. By failing to
examine how an individual's gender identity intersects with her racial
identity or other social identities important to her sense of self, the research
134 See Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 48, at 331 ("Shifting people's
perspective from their personal situation to that of their group enhances feelings of
discrimination.").
135 See Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 225-26, 22829. See also Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 95 (discussing
research showing a positive association between having a high level of group identification
and the likelihood of perceiving prejudice); id. at 94 (explaining that group-identification can
help individuals cope with perceived discrimination since "[g]roups can provide emotional,
informational and instrumental support, validation for one's perceptions, and social

consensus for one's attributions").
136

Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination,supra note 9, at 228 ("Increased

identification with one's group may shift interpretation of ambiguous events from the
individual to the group level ... and make individuals more aware of the potential for group
injustice.").
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assumes that an individual's gender consciousness develops and operates
independent of her race. All women belong to multiple social groups, and
we should not assume that a woman's identification with women as a social
group can be understood in unidimensional terms, or that membership in
other social groups would not simultaneously influence different
formulations of group solidarity. A person's identification with a social
group is far more complex than can be understood by examining a single
layer of group identity in isolation.
More research is needed to explore how both of these factorsadherence to "just world" ideology and allegiance to one's social groupmight be marshaled to increase the accuracy of perceptions of bias. What
forces
encourage
group-identification
and
solidarity?
Perhaps
counterintuitively, one study suggests that increasing consciousness of the
prevalence of discrimination against one's social group does not necessarily
promote a strong identification with one's social group.1 37 In this study,
Latino and Latina students who had previously reported a low degree of
group identification with Latino Americans later identified even less with
their social group after reading about pervasive discrimination against
Latino Americans. 138 The reverse was true for Latino and Latina students
who had previously identified strongly as Latino Americans; they identified
139
with Latino Americans even more strongly after reading this account.
These findings suggest that an individual's development of groupconsciousness is a complicated process. Upon reflection, the fact that some
of the students in the study would react to the accounts of widespread
discrimination by distancing from their social group is neither surprising
nor irrational. As a strategy, it seems designed to preserve an individual's
sense of agency and control by discounting the significance of membership
in a stigmatized group to that individual's identity. Such distancing occurs
in many settings, including in the legal profession. For example, after the
release of a study identifying gender bias in some segment of the legal
profession, 40 some women may react negatively to distance themselves
137 See Major et al., Prejudiceand Self-Esteem, supra note 31, at 95.
138

id.

139

id.

140

See, e.g.,

PHYLLIS G. KITZEROW & VIRGINIA

M.

TOMLINSON,

THE LEGAL

available at
http://www.acba.org/ACBA/pdf/ACBAMemSurveyResults2005.pdf (survey of Allegheny
County Bar Association members showing persistent disparities in pay and job satisfaction
between male and female attorneys). For public reaction to the survey, see also Gary
PROFESSION:

A

STUDY

OF

ACBA

MEMBERSHIP

2005

(2006),
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from the results of the study, questioning its methodology and proclaiming
that they themselves have never experienced gender bias in the profession.
Such distancing can make it difficult to talk about perceptions of
bias and contributes to a silence that normalizes the status quo. For
example, a senior female colleague might respond to a more junior
colleague's story of her experiences with male students or colleagues
dismissively, with a tone that suggests "I would never let that happen to
me," and in doing so, send a message denying any influence of gender and
individualizing the problem. Such a response, by distancing from any
common gender experience, individualizes the problem and makes it
difficult to discuss or assess how gender may have influenced the
experience. A similar process might be set in motion by a senior person of
color on a law faculty who heaps criticism on an African American
candidate, opening the door to and legitimating a tirade of subsequent
criticism, with the effect of preempting questions about whether the
candidate is being fairly considered or concerns about institutional bias.
Yet, many individuals do not engage in such distancing strategies
and instead embrace a commonality of interests and a sense of collective
destiny with members of their social group. Questions about how group
consciousness develops and its role in facilitating perceptions of bias, and
constructive responses to it, deserve further study.
II. DISCRIMINATION LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE
PERCEPTION OF GENDER BIAS
Much legal scholarship falling under the wide umbrella of the "law
and society" movement asserts and explains the thesis that law actively
participates in the production of knowledge.14 1 Legal narratives and
Rotstein, Women Lawyers Here Still Lagging in Pay, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 14,
2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06257/721762-28.stm.
141See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms
of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life, in LAW INEVERYDAY LIFE 21, 27- 28, 50-54 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993) (discussing law's "constitutive force" and "meaningmaking power" as explored in legal scholarship); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER
OF LAW 10-13 (1989) (developing a feminist critique of legal knowledge and explaining how
legal discourse stakes out a special claim to truth and disqualifies other forms of knowledge

and experience);

MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW'S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE 5-15

(2003) (explaining her approach,
exploring law's production of
Perspectives on Lives in the Law,
eds., 2002) (describing the work
production of knowledge).

which draws from sociology of knowledge studies, in
knowledge); Lawrence Douglas et al., Theoretical
in LIVES INTHE LAW 1, 10-11 (Lawrence Douglas et al.
of socio-legal scholars emphasizing law's role in the
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discourses do more than passively reflect social and extralegal knowledge;
they actively shape and influence it. To the extent that discrimination
doctrine and the narratives that emerge from it shape our understandings
and perceptions of bias, their messages work to conceal rather than expose
the existence of gender bias. Specifically, discrimination law's narratives
reinforce the cognitive and motivational barriers to perceiving bias
described in the previous section.
The dominant story told by discrimination law is one of a world in
which merit is the rule and discrimination is aberrational and insignificant
as an explanation for pervasive inequality in outcomes. 42 The universe of
actionable discrimination is, for the most part, limited to conscious,
intentional discrimination by an individual perpetrator. 143 It is eclipsed by
the alternative and much larger universe of merit and individual
responsibility.
Discrimination cases are framed as stories with competing,
mutually exclusive narratives in which the fact-finder has to decide between
the story line in which a bad, intentionally sexist or racist actor harms an
innocent victim and the one in which the plaintiff's own flaws produced the
bad ending. These story lines clash in countless discrimination cases. More
often than not, the narrative that confirms the "just world" and individual
responsibility thesis prevails. 44 In the dominant narrative, the plaintiff
failed to get the raise, promotion, or opportunity because she was not
sufficiently competent or deserving. 45 On the fewer occasions when the
142 See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Alan Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407
(1990); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989).
143 See, e.g., Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding,supra note 32, at

747-48; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-10 (2006) (summarizing scholarship criticizing antidiscrimination

law's focus on intentional discrimination and its failure to reach unconscious bias).
144 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 559-62 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?] (examining lower court decisions in employment

discrimination cases and insurance cases and finding that plaintiffs fare much worse in
employment discrimination cases); Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a
Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 546-49 (2001) (critiquing the
anti-plaintiff bias in employment discrimination cases).
145For a discussion of how discrimination law reinforces this dominant narrative,
see West, supra note 41, at 145:
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alternative narrative prevails, there are usually enough smoking gun
comments to suggest that one or more bad actors intentionally and
malevolently took sex into account. 146
In viewing bias-versus-merit as an either/or system of mutually
exclusive story lines, law confines discrimination to the tiny space reserved
for anomalous exceptions to the "just world" norm. 147 In this way,
discrimination law purports to rectify aberrations from a presumptive
meritocracy, while ultimately reinforcing the dominant story line that
"people get what they deserve." In a reciprocal relationship, the belief in a
"just world" and individual responsibility shapes law's stingy approach to
The intent requirement in discrimination law is one way of maintaining
and justifying the present myth of meritocracy. By pretending that
discrimination results only from decisions made by people with
prejudicial motives, and because most of us think we do not operate with
such motives, we can continue to believe that those of us who have
succeeded in this system have done so by our own meritorious
performance.
Id.
146

See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 272-73 (1989)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) (relying on sexist remarks to infer stereotyping). However, even
when overtly sexist remarks occur, courts often minimize the significance of such remarks
and reject them as sufficient to establish discrimination. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy
Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MiNN. L. REV. 587, 634-42
(2000) (criticizing a trend in the lower courts to discount overtly biased remarks).
147 Although the mixed motive model of employment discrimination law purports

to address a situation where multiple motives, legitimate and illegitimate, caused the adverse
outcome, its cramped application in the courts has relegated it to the margins. See Ann C.
McGinley, iViva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 472-77 (2000) (describing this model and its limitations). Moreover,
this model is equally vulnerable to the pull of "just world" ideology, since it assumes that
merit and sexism are distinct and separable categories. For example, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the paradigmatic mixed motive case, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion assumed
that the plaintiff's interpersonal problems provided a legitimate basis for the denial of
partnership, as long as this reason alone, untainted by gender stereotyping, would have
caused it to make the same decisions. 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). Justice Brennan stated:
The very premise of a mixed motives case is that a legitimate reason was
present, and indeed, in this case, Price Waterhouse already has made this
showing by convincing Judge Gesell that Hopkins' interpersonal
problems were a legitimate concern. The employer instead must show
that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make
the same decision.
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discrimination claims, and the narrow confines of discrimination doctrine in
turn reinforce this very ideology.148 In the process, the messages of
discrimination law contribute to the denial of gender bias by bolstering the
ideologies that suppress attributions to bias.
The dominant narratives of discrimination law also reinforce the
reluctance to detect bias by limiting actionable discrimination, for the most
part, to instances where an individual decision-maker acts with a conscious,
discriminatory intent.1 49 Despite calls to broaden the reach of discrimination
doctrine, attempts to incorporate a structural or institutional approach into
discrimination law have succeeded only at the margins.150 The dominant
frame of discrimination law still requires a villain. Under such a governing
framework, it is difficult to resist the temptation to set aside suspicions of
bias in the face ' of
protestations that the actor who might have engaged in it
5
is "a nice guy.,'

1

More subtly, discrimination doctrine also reinforces the
appropriateness of within-gender comparisons. Although actionable
discrimination claims require a plaintiff to establish differential treatment in
relation to a similarly situated person of the other sex, discrimination law
treats such comparisons as legitimate only when the comparators are similar
148 See, e.g., Selmi, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to Win?,

supra note 144 (attributing the unusually high loss record of employment discrimination
plaintiffs to judges' unconscious bias and reluctance to believe that discrimination is
widespread); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L. REV. 279 (1997) (arguing that the Court's application of a
stringent discriminatory intent requirement reflects its skepticism about the continuing
frequency and extent of discrimination in society).
149See Lawton, supra note 146, at 590-91; McGinley, supra note 147, at 445-46,
480 (summarizing social science research on unconscious bias and criticizing Title V1I's
limitation to conscious, intentional bias). See also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. 91, 136-44 (2003) (discussing the limits of disparate impact doctrine).

150See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 143, at 2-4 (citing scholarship in the past
decade calling for a structural, regulatory approach to discrimination law, but observing that
these efforts have failed to make major inroads in changing the shape of discrimination law).
151 See

generally Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining, supra note 27, at 1151

(discussing the strategies women use to deflect and reframe harassment by not "taking it
personal"). For an extreme example of one plaintiff's prolonged but ultimately unsuccessful
efforts to reframe and excuse sexist behavior with the "nice guy" label, see Lamere v. New
York State Office for the Aging, No. 03-CV-356, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41904 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 27, 2005). See also Zelinski v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 03-4025, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16576 (3d Cir. Aug. 11, 2004) (noting that the supervisor dismissed the plaintiff's
harassment allegation because the alleged harasser was a "nice guy").
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except for their gender. The case law overwhelming questions the salience
of comparing women's treatment to that of men where women are
differently situated from men. 152 The doctrinal take-home message is that a
proper comparison is one that compares likes with likes, often referred to as
the similarly situated requirement.
Discrimination law also has the potential to suppress women's
sense of entitlement by treating so much gender inequality as not
actionable, implicitly classifying what remains as sex-neutral. In making
this claim, I recognize that law's effect on individual sense of entitlement is
complicated, as legal rights can empower people to expect and demand
more favorable treatment. 153 However, a narrow construction of rights can
suppress feelings of entitlement by normalizing and legitimating the range
of conduct that does not fall within the scope of legal rights.
A number of legal doctrines within discrimination law operate to
narrow the scope of gender equality rights, setting a high bar for what is
actionable, and implicitly erasing gender bias that is not encompassed by
the reach of the law. Harassment law, for example, reaches only conduct
that is severe or pervasive, sheltering even offensive gender-based behavior
that falls short of that standard. 154 The requirement of tangible harm for
vicarious liability without an affirmative defense also promotes the idea that
the worthiness of the claim turns on the level of harm. 155 Absent tangible
152 For two of many examples, see Stanley v. University of Southern California,

178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the University's decision to pay a female coach
of a women's team less than a male coach of a men's team was not discriminatory where the
male coach was differently situated with respect to bringing in revenue), and Ezold v. Wolf
Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992) (overturning a lower court's
finding that the law firm discriminated against the plaintiff in not making her partner where
the plaintiff was not sufficiently similar to any of the male associates who made partner). See
also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 200, 220-21

(1989) (criticizing the similarly situated requirement in sex discrimination law); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality UnderLaw, 100 YALE L. J. 1281 (1991) (same).
153 For an excellent discussion of how the Family and Medical Leave Act has
increased employees' bargaining power in informal negotiations with employers, see
Catherine R. Albiston, Law in the Workplace: Bargaining in the Shadow of Social
Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil

Rights, 39 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 11 (2005).
154 See Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges

and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 805-19
(2002) (arguing that courts set the bar too high in determining what level of severity and
pervasiveness is required to qualify as unlawful harassment).
155

See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Faragher v.

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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harm, harassment victims bear the costs of not complaining and failing to
take the initiative to improve their situation. 156 Title VII case law also
includes a line of cases that carve out de minimus discrimination from the
law's reach, legalizing sex bias that stops short of a certain threshold of
harm. 157 Finally, retaliation law, despite the Court's recent rejection of an
ultimate decision requirement, still requires a sufficient level of adverse
action so as to deter a reasonable person from complaining. The Court's
158
decision in Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railroad Company v. White,
which formulated this standard, is too recent to tell how much of a hurdle it
will create in retaliation cases; however, the Court's suggestion that mere
social ostracism by coworkers would not likely suffice indicates that some
forms of retaliation will fall short of this standard. 159 The underlying
message in all of this doctrine reminds me of the best-selling self-help book
160
from years back, Don't Sweat the Small Stuff... andIt's All Small Stuff
The disconnect between the rhetoric and reality of retaliation law
also fuels the reluctance to challenge bias, which in turn encourages people
156

See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 143 (2004) (explaining

the Court's sexual harassment precedents as allowing employers the opportunity to establish
an affirmative defense to liability for creating a hostile environment absent tangible harm to
the plaintiff).
157

For a summary of cases exempting "minor" adverse employment decisions

from challenge, see MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DIScRiMINATION 104-05 (Aspen, 6th ed. 2003) (including as "minor" such actions as asking
gender-specific questions at job interviews, giving an employee a mid-range evaluation,
laterally transferring an employee without a cut in pay, failure to provide a computer,
replacing personal staff and giving a negative evaluation, and the denial of a bonus). See also
Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimus Discrimination, 47 EMORY L. J. 1121 (1998)
(criticizing the de minimus exception in Title VII law); Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer
Games Count as Terms, Conditions or Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C.
L. REV. 643 (1996) (criticizing Title Vii's failure to reach outside-the-workplace
networking).
"' 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006) (concluding that Title VIl's prohibition on
retaliation "covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially
adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant," and observing that, "[i]n the present
context that means that the employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they could
well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination").
159 Id. at 2415 (distinguishing "significant" harms, which are covered, from "trivial

harms," which are not, and suggesting that "snubbing" and "antipathy" from coworkers
would fall in the latter category).
160 RICHARD CARLSON, DON'T SWEAT THE SMALL STUFF...

AND IT'S ALL SMALL

STUFF: SIMPLE WAYS TO KEEP THE LITTLE THINGS FROM TAKING OVER YOUR LIFE

(1997).
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to submerge perceptions of bias as a way of explaining why they did not
complain. If sexism strikes and no one complains, perhaps it wasn't sexism
at all. As explained in the previous section, a person who perceives
discrimination but does not challenge it defies widely shared expectations
that true victims of bias confront and challenge it. But in reality, few people
challenge bias when it targets them. The discomfort of perceiving bias but
not challenging it can set in motion a process of revision and denial.
Retaliation law does not offer enough encouragement to
prospective complainants to break through this process. Discrimination law
is replete with generous and reassuring rhetoric promising full protection
from retaliation, which reinforces the pressure on victims to complain and
harsh judgments against them when they do not. 161 But the law's reality
does not match its rhetoric. Legal protections fall far short of offering full
protection to complainants, leaving fears of retaliation well-founded.
This Article is not the place for a thorough discussion of the limits
of retaliation law, but a number of doctrinal limitations deserve brief
mention. As I have detailed elsewhere, the reasonable belief doctrine
imposes a stark limit on plaintiffs who complain of conduct they perceive as
racist or sexist, but which the current legal doctrine does not recognize as
actionable discrimination.1 62 Applying this doctrine, the Fourth Circuit
recently ruled that an African American who was fired for complaining of a
coworker's blatantly racist comments in a break room had no recourse
because it was not reasonable for him to believe that these isolated
comments, in and of themselves, created a legally actionable
environment. 63 As lower courts have applied the reasonable belief doctrine
in retaliation cases, it leaves people woefully unprotected from retaliation,
especially when they challenge subtle forms of bias that do not perfectly
64
match narrower judicial understandings of actionable discrimination.'
Other limits also
discrimination unprotected

leave many persons who complain of
from retaliation. Stringent approaches to

161 See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (stating that Title VII

provides "broad protection" from retaliation); Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259
F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The bringing of a retaliation claim, rather than failing to

report harassment, is the proper method for dealing with retaliation.") (internal citation
omitted).
162Brake, supra note 89, at 76-103.

163See Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
164See Brake, supra note 89, at 86-101.
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165
causation can make it difficult to infer retaliation without a smoking gun.
In addition, not all retaliatory actions are prohibited, only those which
courts believe would chill a reasonable person from coming forward with a
complaint.166 There is a danger that courts will underestimate the propensity
for even seemingly minor retaliatory acts to chill potential complaints, as
evidenced by the Court's questionable assumption that "snubbing" or social
ostracism by colleagues would not be likely to do SO.167 An additional
constraint limits the type of actions challengers may take in confronting
discrimination and still receive protection from retaliation. Professor Terry
Smith has insightfully critiqued the requirement that opposition to
discrimination must take the form of a "reasonably proportionate" response,
showing how courts have used this doctrine to sort out some challengers,
especially persons of color, as undeserving of protection.' 68 Finally,
165See, e.g., Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th

Cir. 2002) (requiring employee to show either direct evidence of retaliation or that "only he,
and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, was subjected to an
adverse employment action even though he was performing his job in a satisfactory
manner"). Proof of causation is further complicated by the refusal of many courts to extend §
703(m) of the Civil Rights Act to retaliation claims, thereby allowing employers to defeat
liability by proving that, notwithstanding the existence of a retaliatory motive behind the
adverse action, the same action would have been taken anyway for a legitimate reason. See,
e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11 th Cir. 2001); Speedy v. Rexnord
Corp., 243 F.3d 397 (7th Cir. 2001); Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2000); Kubicko v.
Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d
913, 933-35 (3d Cir. 1997).
166
Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-16.
167Id. at 2415. For evidence suggesting that this assumption is incorrect, see Loy,
The Extent and Effects, supra note 92, at 40 (describing the results of a study finding that the
most common negative response to the vocalization of sexual harassment by sexually
harassed women was social stigmatization from coworkers, including ignoring and
nonsupport, and that these reactions negatively affected the work environment and further
stigmatized the target).
168 See Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of
Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 529 (2003). For a sampling of cases employing this
doctrine to exempt complainants from protection, see Jennings v. Tinley Park Community
Consolidated School District No. 146, 864 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
secretary's delivery of equal pay demands directly to the school board, bypassing the
superintendent, was not reasonably proportionate opposition); Hazel v. Postmaster General,
7 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a refusal to work in opposition to perceived
discrimination was not reasonably proportionate opposition); EEOC v. Total System
Services, Inc., 221 F.3d 1171 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employer may terminate an
employee based on a reasonable, good faith belief that the employee lied in the course of
opposing discrimination); Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that an employee's slapping of a sexual harasser is not protected).
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Professor Alex Long has discussed the law's failure to fully protect the
challenger's friends and family members from retaliation, leaving a gaping
69
hole in the protection that discrimination law provides against retaliation.
A final way in which the discourses and doctrines of discrimination
law obstruct perceptions of bias is in the law's emphasis on promoting
individuality over group consciousness. Discrimination law's relationship to
group consciousness is complex. On the one hand, discrimination law might
be thought to promote group consciousness, since it reinforces the salience
of social group membership on the basis of race, gender, and other
protected classifications. However, the overriding message in recent
discrimination jurisprudence extols color-blindness and gender-blindness 7as°
the law's animating precepts over an alternative group-based perspective.
The doctrine treats discrimination as an individual problem, tightly limiting
group-based perspectives and relegating them to the margins. Rather than
encouraging race or gender consciousness as a way of preventing and
remedying discrimination, discrimination law treats it as a necessary evil at
best, and tantamount to violating the nondiscrimination principle at
worst.'17

Since group consciousness is a key factor in an individual's

likelihood of perceiving race or gender bias, as discussed above, the
narratives of discrimination law promoting individuality over group-based
identification operate to further discourage perceptions of bias.

169See Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend: Preventing RetaliationAgainst
Third Parties, Protecting the Right of Association in the Workplace, and Combating
Workplace Discrimination,59 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
170See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,

151-54 (1994)

(Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing equal protection as an individual right, and insisting

that individual jurors decide cases in a gender-neutral fashion); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (adopting strict scrutiny for all racial classifications and treating
racial classifications burdening minorities as tantamount to racial classifications burdening
whites for purposes of selecting a standard of scrutiny).
171See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "ColorBlindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77
(2000) (discussing and critiquing color-blindness and gender-blindness in antidiscrimination
law); Jerome McCrystal Culp, Jr., Colorblindness Remedies and the Intersectionality of
Oppression: Policy Arguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 172,
172 n.38 (1994) (describing and critiquing the Supreme Court's pursuit of color-blindness as
a moral objective).
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III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND AN EXAMPLE: READING
STUDENT COURSE EVALUATIONS
For an example of how these psychological processes and legal
narratives might play out in a particular setting, consider the case of student
course evaluations. Much evidence suggests that student course evaluations
are influenced by the gender and race of faculty members.172 Women
faculty of color and young women faculty, who do not have years of
experience to help dispel a presumption of incompetence, may be especially
vulnerable to student bias in evaluations.173 Yet law schools treat student
evaluations as an objective measure of teaching performance, typically
relying on them to evaluate teaching for purposes of tenure, lateral hires,
visiting opportunities, promotions, and pay raises. Rarely is their legitimacy
and neutrality called into question-at
least with regard to their implications
1 74
for gender and racial equality.
172 See, e.g., Christine M. Bachen et al., Assessing the Role of Gender in College
Students' Evaluations of Faculty, 48 CoMM. EDUC. 193 (1999) (describing their research on
the influence of sex role expectations on student evaluations of male and female professors
and explaining how the gender of students and their adherence to traditional gender schema
interacts with the gender of faculty in affecting evaluations); Tamara Baldwin & Nancy
Blattner, Guarding Against Potential Bias in Student Evaluations: What Every Faculty
Member Needs to Know, 51 C. TEACHING 27, 28 (2003) (citing research identifying "gender
and gender-related issues" as sources of bias in student evaluations); Farley, supra note 3, at
334, 336-47 (citing research showing "that student evaluations of women faculty tend to be
more hostile than those of male faculty," and discussing anecdotal evidence and results of
her study of course evaluations at one law school showing a double-bind facing female law
teachers); Rhode, supra note 1, at 482 (acknowledging the double standards and double
binds that confront female faculty and citing sources documenting gender bias in the
evaluation of female faculty); Deborah Jones Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student
Evaluations of Teaching, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 87 (2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=963196 (explaining the influence of nonverbal behaviors on student
evaluations and the process by which race and gender influence evaluations).
173 Cf Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield, supra note 8, at 198
(discussing the legendary Professor Kingsfield from the movie The Paper Chase as the
prototype for law professors, and stating that "[s]tudents still expect teachers who look and
sound like Kingsfield to be competent, while others have to prove their competency").
174 See Katherine L. Vaughns, Women of Color in Law Teaching: Shared
Identities, Different Experiences, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 496, 501 (2003) (noting the potential
for bias in student evaluations to negatively affect promotion and retention decisions, and
that more credence is given to negative student reactions in such decisions than to positive
student observations). A recent article in the Chronicle of Higher Education highlighted
evidence that student evaluations are biased by lookism, focusing on the objectification of
male faculty, for whom the study found three times as great an effect from looks as it did for
women. The article only briefly noted concerns that the evaluations reflect gender and racial
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Part of the difficulty in challenging the use of student evaluations is
that it is difficult to determine whether sex or race bias has influenced
student evaluations in any particular case. Many student comments
reviewing women faculty might be interpreted to suggest gender bias, but
are subtle or ambiguous. Comments focusing on a female professor's
availability, warmth, personality, and helpfulness, for example, might
reflect gendered expectations that hold female faculty to higher standards of
attentiveness and nurturance, while minimizing and understating intellectual
strengths and core competence. 175 Likewise, hostile comments and
comments highlighting the professor's political beliefs or values may reflect
heightened resistance to female authority, especially a female professor who
is or is perceived to be a feminist. On the other hand, at least some of these
qualities and characteristics are not in and of themselves irrelevant or
illegitimate considerations, if applied evenhandedly and undistorted by
gendered expectations. Without blatant and unambiguous signals of
prejudice, any individual set of evaluations is unlikely to be perceived as
tainted by gender bias.
In the culture of the legal academy, in which student evaluations are
taken as an indicator of merit, both "just world" ideology and the belief in
individual control strongly favor internalizing any fault for a disappointing
set of evaluations. For a female faculty member who may be concerned
about her evaluations, the tendency toward within-group comparisons also
lessens the likelihood that she will discern the presence of bias. If women
compare their experiences reading student evaluations with other women, or
internally with their own past experience, these comparisons can have a
normalizing effect, obscuring any role that gender privilege may play in the
process. An added difficulty is the absence of information disclosing
across-the-board comparisons, broken down by race, gender, sexual
orientation, and other relevant information such as years in teaching, class
size, and qualitative differences in written comments. Without aggregate
data, cognitive limitations discourage gender-based inferences and favor
neutral explanations.

bias against women and racial minorities on faculties. Gabriela Montell, Do Good Looks
Equal Good Evaluations?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 15, 2003, http://chronicle.com/jobs/
2003/10/2003101501c.htm.
175 Farley, supra note 3, at 334 ("When women law professors do receive positive
comments, they are much different in nature from the comments received by male

professors. Whereas men are most often praised for their 'mastery of the subject matter,'
women are usually praised for being enthusiastic and approachable.").
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The general reluctance on the part of law faculty to raise concerns
about bias in student evaluations further contributes to the widespread
denial of any problem.1 76 A faculty member who raises concerns about race
and gender bias in student evaluations risks being accused of "making
7
excuses" for a particular candidate or not caring about teaching. 7 Such a
hostile reaction is not surprising, since recognizing flaws in student
evaluations would clash with the belief that faculty rewards are based on
merit.
To the extent that law faculties are steeped in the lessons of
discrimination law, we may be less rather than more likely to see race or
sex bias in student evaluations as a concern. 7 8 At least absent obvious
smoking gun comments revealing prejudice, the storyline of individual fault
usually triumphs in discrimination cases. Even if some influence of bias is
suspected, discrimination law insists on proof that an overall assessment is
negatively affected and translates into actual disadvantage in some material
way. Because student evaluations are only one factor among several in an
assessment of teaching that may influence a hiring or promotion decision,
the ultimate impact of even a clearly biased set of evaluations is far from
apparent. By setting up extreme and incontrovertible bias as the paradigm
of discrimination,79the accumulation of small disadvantages goes unnoticed
and unremedied. 1
176

Cf Vaughns, supra note 174, at 500 (criticizing the failure of law faculties "to

even consider the possibility that students' perceptions of a teacher's ability may be tinged
by societal evaluations of racial or gender inferiority, i.e., the 'usual' stereotypes," and their
dismissal of critics "as having chips on our shoulders or making much ado about something
insignificant"); Farley, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that "many men and women deny the
fact that women professors face a more challenging classroom audience; those who complain
may even be accused of having a vivid imagination").
177 Cf Vaughns, supra note 174, at 501 (noting concerns that racial and gender

stereotypes influence student evaluations, but stating that "many in academe view student
criticisms as legitimate fair assessment of teachers' ability and are unwilling, for whatever
reasons, even to acknowledge such a possibility [that they are not]"). Cf Rhode, supra note
1, at 486 (noting that "[w]hen those [gender] issues do arise, students or faculty who express
strong views frequently are dismissed or demeaned," and "[w]omen who are open about
their feminism, their same-sex orientation, or their views on race have been especially likely
targets of offensive comments, adverse student evaluations, and marginalization by their
colleagues").
178For a general discussion of the failure of discrimination law to address the

problems of gender discrimination against women in the academy, see West, supra note 41.

179 See Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield, supra note 8 (discussing
concept of "the accumulation of small disadvantages" and how small blows
sociological
the
to reputation and prestige compound and grow over time).
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Finally, even if we conclude that race or gender bears some share of
responsibility for a disappointing set of evaluations, that conclusion does
not necessarily protect our self-esteem. More likely, we hold in our mind
multiple causes, including self-blame, which wipe out any self-esteem
benefit of the perception of bias. As Professor Katherine Vaughns has
observed:
The insular life of the academic causes the self-doubter to tie her
self-esteem to any and all criticisms whether or not justified. And
reading student evaluations of her teaching can be a particularly
painful experience. As a result, she may internalize every
negative judgment expressed in those evaluations despite the
presence of positive ones.180
This last point raises a question that may have been nagging at
readers (as it has nagged at the author) all along: are we necessarily better
off if we heighten our perceptions of gender bias to more clearly see it when
it happens? On this score, this Article offers no easy answers. The evidence
suggests that perceiving oneself as a target of chronic or systematic bias
generally lowers a person's overall sense of well-being. 18' And yet, the
failure to perceive bias when it exists has costs too, particularly in reduced
opportunities for collective action and opposition.' 82 The refusal to name a
problem ultimately supports the status quo and closes off opportunities to
forge creative strategies for change. For that reason, perhaps recognizing
and identifying gender bias, in all its subtle forms, is preferable to denial.

180

Vaughns, supra note 174, at 502-03.

181Major et al., It's Not My Fault,supra note 116, at 772 (citing studies showing
that "perceiving oneself as a target of discrimination is positively associated with depression

among women and gay men and with lower self-esteem among women and African
Americans") (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 779 (stating that perceiving bias as
the cause for a negative event may leave people feeling less depressed than if they perceived
an individual attribute such as lack of ability as the cause, but does not lessen the negative
effects of other emotions such as hostility and anxiety).
182 See Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of PersonalDeprivation, supra note 28, at 167
(arguing that minimizing and denying personal discrimination serves to legitimate the status
quo and results in fewer actions to improve one's situation); Jost, Negative Illusions, supra

note 28, at 414 (discussing false consciousness and arguing that "errors in cognition produce

levels of political acquiescence that may be harmful to the individual, the group, and the
society"); see also Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling, supra note 27, at 399-401
(contending that denying discrimination when it has occurred is not an effective strategy for
minimizing its harms).

